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Abstract
This paper argues that one of the most important deci-
sions in designing and deploying censorship resistance
systems is whether one set of system options should be
selected (the best), or whether there should be several
sets of good ones. We model the problem of choosing
these options as a cat-and-mouse game and show that the
best strategy depends on the value the censor associates
with total system censorship versus partial, and the toler-
ance of false positives. If the censor has a low tolerance
to false positives then choosing one censorship resistance
system is best. Otherwise choosing several systems is the
better choice, but the way traffic should be distributed
over the systems depends on the tolerance of the censor
to false negatives. We demonstrate that establishing the
censor’s utility function is critical to discovering the best
strategy for censorship resistance.
1 Achieving censorship resistance
Anonymous communication systems provide a powerful
tool for Internet denizens to speak out against oppres-
sion by protecting their identities. Censorious regimes
try to limit access to such systems to further control their
populations. This paper discusses how to best provide
censorship-resistant access to these anonymous commu-
nication systems. We use Tor as a case study, but the
principles discussed here apply equally well to other sys-
tems. Any such system is built of at least two compo-
nents: one to resist blocking by IP address, and another
to resist blocking based on payload. Additionally, the
system might be designed to resist active probing among
other properties as deemed suitable to combat the threats
posed to the system and its users and operators.
1.1 IP-address blocking resistance
IP-address blocking resistance is achieved by having a
wide variety of IP addresses that will provide access to
the network, possibly in combination with distributing IP
addresses to users of the network such that the censor is
not able to discover them. “Bridges” [1] are Tor’s ap-
proach to this part of the problem. Here, Tor users in
countries that do not block access to the Tor network are
encouraged to run a Tor node that is not listed in the pub-
lic Tor directory. IP addresses of bridges are distributed
such that an adversary with limited resources (in partic-
ular, IP addresses and Gmail email addresses) is unable
to enumerate all bridges. By making it as easy as possi-
ble to set up bridges, it was hoped there would be many,
and the distribution strategy was designed such that Tor
users in countries that block Tor will be able to find at
least one IP address that the censor does not know about.
Tor’s strategy has been successful; while China was able
to discover and block a large proportion of bridges, Tor
users in other countries from which access to the Tor net-
work is blocked by IP address still can use bridges.
An alternative approach to be proposed is to have a
relatively small number of bridge nodes accessible via a
very large number of IP addresses. These IP addresses
are shared with other services. This is done to avoid
wasting IP addresses and, more importantly, also to force
censors to block access to important services that are not
banned in the country. This threat of collateral damage,
through false positives, is to discourage attempts to block
the IP addresses associated with the bridges. These goals
are achieved through “Decoy Routing” [12, 2], where
network traffic destined to the anonymous communica-
tion system is steganographically tagged and sent to an
IP address in a network which supports decoy routing.
The border router for this network, or a specialized com-
puter designed for this task, detects the tag and routes the
traffic to the anonymous communication system.
Another similar approach is “triangle routing” [3]. In
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itself, this does not provide any additional IP addresses
for accessing the anonymous communication network,
so bridges or a similar approach is still required. What
triangle routing achieves is to permit these bridges to be
on low-bandwidth connections yet still offer high perfor-
mance. Network traffic exiting the censored country does
get relayed via the bridge node, to a network-entry node,
but return traffic is sent directly from the network-entry
node to the user, spoofing the IP address of the bridge.
1.2 Payload-blocking resistance
The advantage for the censor of IP-address based block-
ing is that standard IP routers are, by definition, capa-
ble of routing traffic based on IP address and can thus
redirect or block traffic destined for certain IP addresses.
However, more sophisticated routers and specialized
censorship equipment is capable of looking within pack-
ets (known as Deep Packet Inspection, DPI) and blocking
network traffic which fulfils particular criteria. Therefore
censorship resistance systems must also disguise packet
content. For the purpose of this paper the payload-
blocking resistance will also include resisting blocking
based on port number, packet timing and packet size and
other payload characterisitics.
1.2.1 Impersonating nothing
One approach to payload-blocking resistance is for net-
work traffic to have no static characteristics. Payload
data is encrypted to appear indistinguishable from ran-
dom; packet sizes and timings are also randomized. The
encryption necessitates some sort of key agreement. This
could be unauthenticated, such as simply sending the key
in the clear at the start of the communication, or per-
forming ephemeral Diffie-Hellman. The former option
is vulnerable to network blocking equipment capable of
extracting the key and decrypting subsequent traffic. The
latter is resistant to passive attack, but vulnerable to an
active man-in-the-middle. Alternatively, key agreement
could be performed out of band or the client could be au-
thenticated based on credentials exchanged out of band.
One system that takes the “impersonating nothing” ap-
proach is obfs3 [9]. This is a wrapper around the Tor
bridge protocol, which works by sending the obfuscation
key in the clear at the start of the communication. Sub-
sequent traffic is encrypted by AES under keys derived
from the obfuscation key. As with normal Tor bridges,
obfs3 can use any TCP port, and the choice made by the
obfs3-bridge must be communicated to the user, along
with the IP address. No attempt is currently made to hide
packet timing or size. While obfs3 does not perform any
authentication or integrity checks, it wraps the unmodi-
fied Tor protocol which does perform both.
Another system with similar goals is Dust [11]. Like
obfs3, network traffic is indistinguishable from random,
but it aims to resist both active and passive attack by re-
lying on a password exchanged out of band. Dust also
performs integrity checks and provides replay protection.
While Dust can be used over both UDP and TCP (obfs3
is TCP only), it does not provide a reliable in-order trans-
port if sent over UDP, so an additional layer would be
needed before a TCP-based protocol such as Tor could
be used with the UDP variant. Like obfs3, Dust also does
not itself hide packet timings or lengths.
The advantage of the “impersonating nothing” ap-
proach is that it has no static payload signature that could
be programmed into DPI equipment. However, such traf-
fic is also unlike almost anything else seen on the Inter-
net, so if DPI equipment can detect it, the false positive
rate would likely be very low. One such test would be to
measure the entropy of a communication stream, using
one or more of the many tests for random number gen-
erators. Any traffic with a value that is higher than ex-
pected would be blocked. Performing such a test would
be challenging because it cannot be expressed as a reg-
ular expression, which is the common interface exposed
by DPI equipment for configuring new blocking rules.
Additionally, some entropy tests have high RAM and
CPU usage and so would be infeasible to run directly on
high-bandwidth DPI equipment which only has a hand-
ful of CPU cycles for each packet, and store a few tens
of bytes for each stream. Therefore a staged approach
would be needed: efficient initial tests either for entropy
or to exclude known protocols would be performed on
all traffic, and only selected packets would be sent for
subsequent processing.
Another way of blocking “impersonating nothing”
protocols is through a whitelist. Only protocols which
match a particular (perhaps port-dependent) signature
would be permitted. As even encrypted traffic is com-
monly surrounded by an unencrypted header, it would
be possible to find a set of DPI rules which would per-
mit a substantial portion of network traffic. However,
protocols which were not explicitly permitted would be
blocked, and so there could be a substantial false-positive
rate, especially for more obscure protocols. This false-
positive rate would increase if more protocols became
indistinguishable from random, so one way for protocol
designers to help censorship resistance would be to hide
any protocol characteristics, even if they have no need
for censorship resistance themselves.
1.2.2 Impersonating something
As an alternative, the censorship-resistance scheme
could impersonate a particular network protocol. Tor al-
ready does this to some extent, by using TLS for its out-
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ermost cryptography layer. Initial versions of Tor made
no attempt to appear like web browsing, and so Tor TLS
connections included a number of distinctive character-
istics such as static fields in certificates and an unusual
set of ciphersuites. Later, the Tor TLS options were
made closer to that of common web browsers and web
servers, by randomizing certificate fields and selecting
ciphersuites commonly seen on the Internet.
However, Tor differs from typical encrypted web
browsing in one important way, which is that connections
between Tor relays depends on bidirectional authentica-
tion, rather than only server-to-client. In the initial ver-
sion of Tor, the client certificate was sent unencrypted
and thus could be used to block traffic. In later versions
of Tor, the client certificate is sent during a renegotiation
phase, which is encrypted. Unfortunately, the fact that
renegotiation is being performed can be inferred from
the plaintext in the network traffic, because the type of
a TLS record is not encrypted, and a client certificate is
of a different type from the application data which would
be expected after TLS key exchange.
Efforts are underway to make Tor traffic even closer to
encrypted web browsing. So far these include using more
commonly seen Diffie-Hellman parameters, and extend-
ing the expiry time of certificates to be more plausible.
The next step to be taken will be to disguise the renegoti-
ation step, by implementing client-to-server authentica-
tion within the Tor protocol itself.
However, impersonating TLS is not a silver bullet.
TLS is very common, and blocking TLS would cut off
access to many useful Internet services, but countries
have been willing to do so. Iran, in particular, has
blocked TLS across much of the country for periods of
time [8]. While partial, these blocks were at precisely
the time that access to an anonymous communication
network would be most important. For this reason, Tor
supports “pluggable transports”, which are external pro-
grams responsible for obfuscating Tor traffic. obfs3 is
one such pluggable transport, but it was always intended
that there be many such available, taking a variety of
approaches. Such approaches do not only include the
obfuscation technique, but also development practices—
while Tor is open source, there is no reason that an plug-
gable transport could not be distributed as an obfuscated
binary if that was considered to make it hard to reverse
engineer and block. Existing pluggable transports in-
clude impersonating HTTP traffic like StegaTorus [10]
and impersonating Skype traffic like SkypeMorph [4].
1.3 Scanning resistance
Being accessible at a wide variety of IP addresses, and
disguising payload, are sufficient for resisting passive
blocking. However, more sophisticated adversaries may
also perform active attacks by scanning IP addresses and
detecting whether they are entry points for an anonymous
communication network.
One option would be to proactively scan IP
addresses—perhaps identified through some survelliance
means to reduce the address space— to check if anony-
mous communication software is listening; another is to
target scanning based on network surveillance. China
has taken the latter approach, by recording which IP
addresses are contacted by computers in China over
TLS where the ciphersuite list matches the one used by
Tor [7]. Shortly after such a connection, another com-
puter in China probes the IP address and attempts to es-
tablish a Tor circuit, and if successful, the IP address
is blocked. This approach has allowed China to almost
completely block access to non-obfuscated Tor bridges.
To resist such probing, there needs to be a way
for anonymous communication nodes to distinguish be-
tween legitimate access and probing, and either fail to
respond to probing or return content which the cen-
sor considers innocuous. This goal can be achieved by
sharing a secret between the legitimate user and the ac-
cess node, and designing an authentication scheme for
which an authentication failure is indistinguishable from
the node not being an access node. One such scheme
is BridgeSPA [6], which encodes an authentication to-
ken into the TCP initial sequence number and timestamp
field, and simply rejects connections for which the au-
thentication check fails.
2 Putting it all together
For each of the components of a censorship resistance
system, there are a wide variety of options available.
Each of the options available has its own advantages
and there is a trade-off between in terms of overhead,
implementation and deployment difficulty, and security.
One common question, however, is whether to put lim-
ited development effort into making one censorship re-
sistance scheme that is highly resistant to blocking, or to
spread effort over multiple, less robust methods. Which
option is the best is more of a question of economic in-
centives rather than a purely technical decision. As such
it depends on how both the censor and developer of the
censorship resistance system value particular situations.
2.1 Censor costs
The costs of the censor are mainly in terms of political
capital and financial capital. Political capital is spent by
false positives (by annoying users of services that are not
intended to be blocked, i.e. collateral damage) and false
negatives (by failing to block sites that they should, i.e.
3
information leakage). Financial capital is spent on block-
ing equipment and engineering time adding and testing
new blocking rules and the variable cost of deploying
such a system to suit the scale of traffic being monitored.
Neither cost function is necessarily in direct propor-
tion to the underlying quantities; there could easily be
discontinuities. It may also be that these costs are step
functions where costs stay the same until some thresh-
old limit after which the costs skyrocket. Knowing these
threshold limits is key in deploying, and overcoming,
economically sound censorship systems.
2.2 Modelling the Cost of Censorship
We now move towards establishing a model for quantify-
ing the cost of censorship. As noted above it is difficult
to establish the true total cost of censorship, such as the
cost of developing and training the technology, maintain-
ing it, and the associated cost of failure – political and
financial. To get around this shortcoming we shift our
focus to the accuracy of the censor’s tools and use it as a
proxy to understand the magnitude of the costs.
2.2.1 Technological Limits
Censorship technology is limited by shortcomings in the
languages used to define classification expressions, the
computational and memory costs of real-time processing
and the partial view of the attack surface amongst other
considerations. It is important, then, to take in to account
the rate at which objects of interest are misclassified. The
two types of errors—false positives and false negatives—
govern the confidence the censor has in their censorship
apparatus. The prevalence of each of these type of errors
provides an important input for both the censor and the
defender in defining their respective strategies.
The base rate bias further thwarts accurate detection in
favour of misclassification when the censor’s false posi-
tive rate is comparable in size to, or larger than, the in-
cidence rate of the defender’s traffic. In such a case, a
significant proportion, if not almost all, of the traffic se-
lected for censoring will be false positives.
2.2.2 False Positives
From the censor’s perspective, false positives are the le-
gitimate traffic, and users, that were misclassified and
blocked—the collateral damage. The censor naturally
seeks to keep this as low as is acceptable. Without cen-
sor cooperation it is difficult to learn the cost of collateral
damage, if indeed the censor is even able to evaluate this
cost itself. However, we can assign a proxy value based
on how many citizens were potentially inconvenienced.
While this most likely does not align with the censor’s
values they can provide an independent measure of the
cost of collateral damage in terms of disgruntled citizens
and hence upward pressure on political costs.
As a strategy, collateral damage has been leveraged
by numerous censorship resistance systems. However,
in most cases the defender assumes an all-or-nothing ap-
proach to censorship, which can be limiting when the
censor is content with partial blocking. The defender’s,
and client’s, costs are in terms of effort to impersonate le-
gitimate protocols since this would give the highest rate
of false positives. The defender must also be careful
to keep the rate of incidence of defender traffic low if
they seek to maximize the amount of collateral damage
caused.
2.2.3 False Negatives
The censor tries to prevent as many clients as it can from
circumventing its blocks—termed information leakage.
Due to the limits of technology it is unable to identify
all of them. The cost to the censor is entirely in terms
of political capital. Since it is hard to quantify the cen-
sor’s cost, indeed he may also not be able to evaluate it in
measurable terms, we use circumventing client connec-
tions as an objective proxy. Again, the censor may not
have the same evaluation; nevertheless the fact remains
that the censorship apparatus has failed in some manner
and the circumventing connections are points of success
for the defender.
The defender’s aim is always to have as much, if not
all, of its traffic classified as a (false) negative. The use of
traffic morphing, steganography, and encryption to name
a few techniques, are instrumental in achieving this goal.
2.2.4 Bringing it Together
The cost to the censor will depend on numerous factors,
including the equipment and expertise necessary to im-
plement censorship, but for simplicity we will assume
that the utility to the censor is only a function of the false
positives and false negatives of the blocking. Moreover,
we will assume that the cost of blocking a protocol is
proportional to how popular the protocol is, whereas in
practice users are more likely to tolerate some protocols
being blocked than others. However the analysis tech-
niques we outline do not depend on these assumptions
and could be generalised if necessary.
As an example, we shall use the following function to
model the censor’s utility in our analysis. The constants
C and D control the tolerance of the censor to false pos-
itives and false negatives respectively. The variable t is
the percentage of the target protocol blocked (i.e. the true
positives) and f is the percentage of other traffic blocked
(i.e. the false positives).
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Uc = 100−200(1− eC( 100−tD + f )) (1)
This function allows a wide range of plausible censor
utility functions to be modelled, and results in a value be-
tween−100 (maximum dissatisfaction) and +100 (max-
imum satisfaction)
3 The Censorship Game
We model the cat-and-mouse game of censor vs. cen-
sorship resistant communications provider (the distribu-
tor in our terminology) as a multi-round game. The dis-
tributor moves first, and provides software which imper-
sonates one or more protocols and distributes user traffic
over these protocols according to some probability distri-
bution. The censor then obtains a copy of the software,
and is able to establish which protocols are being im-
personated and in which proportion. The impersonation
is sufficiently good that the censor must choose to ei-
ther block a protocol entirely – blocking both cover traf-
fic (causing false positives) and the distributor’s traffic
(causing true positives), or leaving it entirely unblocked.
We let the censor move second because it is likely that
the censor can move faster than the distributor because
the distributor must roll out new software to many thou-
sands of users in order to change strategy whereas the
censor needs only to make a configuration change. In
each round the censor will choose a blocking strategy
to maximize their utility function. The goal of the traf-
fic distributor is to find the traffic probability distribution
function such that the censor’s best strategy is the one the
distributor finds most acceptable. This will be the equi-
librium strategy since if either party changes their choice,
they will decrease their own utility.
An interesting consequence of this model is that the
utility function of the censorship resistant communica-
tions provider does not matter, as all they can do is
choose between the collection of scenarios which the
censor has decided to be optimum for a particular strat-
egy of the distributor. Therefore, as long as the distribu-
tor’s utility function is monotonically decreasing in terms
of the true positive rate, the same equilibrium will be
reached regardless of the function’s shape.
3.1 False-positive intolerant censor
We first consider a censor with low tolerance to false
positives. We define this to mean that there is at least
one protocol which they are unwilling to block (a criti-
cal protocol), even if this would result in blocking 100%
of the distributor’s traffic. In this case the distributor
should choose critical protocol and send all censorship-
resistance traffic over it. The censor will not block it,
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Figure 1: Utility of a censor with high false-positive and
false-negative tolerance.
and so 100% of traffic will get through. Any alternative
strategy for the distributor would be less good, as choos-
ing multiple critical protocols would be more effort for
no gain, and choosing a non-critical protocol for some
traffic might lead the censor to block it.
3.2 False-positive tolerant censor
A more interesting case is where there is no such crit-
ical protocol. To give a concrete example, assume that
the distributor can impersonate all of the top 6 protocols
from a 2014 survey of US Internet traffic [5]: YouTube
(13.25%), HTTP (8.47%), BitTorrent (5.03%), SSL
(2.63%), MPEG (2.44%), and Amazon Video (2.37%).
As the censor utility function, we use Equation 1 with
C=−0.015 and D= 1.75. This is illustrated on Figure 1
for three values of true positive rates: 100% (top), 50%
(middle) and 0% (bottom).
We now need to compute the censor utility function for
all combinations of censor strategy and distributor strat-
egy. The censor can choose to block any selection of
protocols of the 6 considered (there is no reason to block
any others). As a result there are 26 = 64 scenarios.
The distributor can choose any probability distribu-
tion, but we exclude any distribution where the traffic
distributed over protocol a is greater than the proportion
distributed over protocol b when the proportion of cover
traffic going over protocol b is greater than that of a. We
do this because if any excluded scenario were chosen, if
a and b were swapped, the censor utility function would
be lower for every censor scenario (assuming the censor
prefers a lower false-positive rate).
Even making this assumption there are still an infinite
number of distributor scenarios, so to reduce the number
we quantize all proportions to be a multiple of 5, result-
ing in 282 distributor scenarios. The result of simulating
all scenarios is shown on Figure 2, where blue is low
utility and red is high utility. The censor scenarios to the
left have low false positives; those to the right have high
false positives. The distributor scenarios at the top have
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Figure 2: Utility heatmap for a censor with high false-
positive and false-negative tolerance. The cell with the
red outline is the best strategy for the censor and the equi-
librium.
traffic heavily skewed to the protocols with most cover
traffic; those at the bottom have traffic more evenly dis-
tributed over protocols. Rectangles show the optimum
censor strategy for each distributor strategy (red for the
equilibrium and black for others).
Even small changes in the distributor scenarios results
in large changes in optimum censor scenario, but the
equilibrium is to distribute traffic quite evenly over pro-
tocols, but not completely. The top 5 protocols should
each get 20% of traffic with the 6th not used at all. The
censor will block protocols 2, 3, 4 and 5 allowing 20% of
the distributor traffic through. Were the attacker to block
protocol 1, the additional false-positives would not jus-
tify the extra 20% of true positives. Were the distributor
to move some traffic onto protocol 6, it would be blocked
because it has a smaller false-positive cost.
3.3 Another false-positive tolerant censor
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Figure 3: Utility for a censor with high false-positive and
low false-negative tolerance.
Let us now consider a censor who is equally tolerant
to false-positives, but far less tolerant to false-negatives
than before, by changing D from 1.75 to 0.75 with the
result shown in Figure 3 Now a 50% false negative rate
is significantly below zero for all false positives, whereas
before it would have been positive if the false positive
rate was low. The resulting simulation is significantly
different, as can be seen in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Utility for a censor with high false-positive and
low false-negative tolerance. The cell with the red out-
line is the best strategy for the censor and the equilib-
rium.
Now the optimum strategy for the censor is almost
always to block many protocols, resulting a high false-
positives (the right hand side of the graph). The equi-
librium strategy is for 95% of traffic to be distributed on
protocol 1 and 5% to be distributed on protocol 2. The
censor will block protocol 1, but leave protocol 2 un-
blocked. This lets only 5% of distributor traffic through,
but it is better than the 0% which almost every other strat-
egy results in. For example, sending 100% over protocol
1 results in protocol 1 being blocked. Sending 80% over
protocol 1 and 10% over protocol 2 results in both pro-
tocols being blocked. Putting only 5% over protocol 2
is small enough that the extra benefit to the censor of
blocking it is not large enough to justify the high false
positives.
4 Conclusions
We have shown how to discover the equilibrium strategy
for a censor-distributor cat-and-mouse game and show
how the censorship resistance provider should distribute
traffic over different protocols to impersonate. The equi-
librium depends on the censor’s utility function, but not
that of the censorship resistance provider. If the censor-
ship resistance provider is in the happy position of being
able to impersonate a protocol which the censor is not
willing to block, then only one protocol should be imper-
sonated. If however the censor is willing to block even
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the most popular protocol, the best strategy is depends
on the detail of the censor’s utility function, and will re-
sult in distributing traffic over some, but perhaps not all
protocols. Discovering this utility function is difficult,
but if approximations can be found it may be possible to
improve the approaches of current censorship resistance
systems.
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